Author: Bismellah Alizada | Translated by Maisam Iltaf
The Shia Hazara community in Afghanistan has historically faced systematic violence on the grounds of their ethnic and religious identity. Since the Taliban takeover, such targeted attacks against the community have continued unabated, with a credible body of evidence alluding to both direct and indirect involvement by the incumbent regime.
In a recent Etilaat Roz report, the author discussed eight critical trends of human rights abuses against Hazaras under Taliban rule. This report adds a ninth alarming trend: the genocidal violence and hate speech against the community, presenting a chronological account of these attacks followed by a brief analysis. However, thorough documentation of the legal, sociological, and political dimensions of these targeted attacks would entail rather extensive research – which is much needed.
Over the past 39 months of Taliban rule, the author has identified at least 61 targeted attacks against Shia Hazaras, which include suicide attacks, bomb explosions including improvised explosive devices (IEDs), targeted shootings, armed assaults, summary killings including beheadings, and mysterious killings. These attacks have left at least 473 dead and 681 wounded, averaging one injury every two days and one death every three days. Of these 61 incidents, 12 have been attributed to Taliban forces, 16 to Islamic State in Khorasan Province (ISKP), and one to armed Kuchi nomads, while the remaining 32 incidents remain unclaimed. It is important to note that these figures are based on the sources cited in this report, and actual casualties are definitely much higher.
Other reports by rights groups and media outlets covering various but much shorter periods within the past 38 months have also recorded highly frequent attacks against Shia Hazaras – and grimly high rate of casualties. An Etilaat Roz investigative report shows that within the first nine months of Taliban rule, at least nine suicide bombings targeted members of the Hazara community, resulting in 100 deaths and 150 injuries. UN Special Rapporteur Richard Bennet’s second report highlights 16 attacks on Hazaras from August 15, 2021, to September 30, 2022. Furthermore, Human Rights Watch recorded at least 17 attacks against Shia Hazaras between August 15, 2021, and early September 2022, resulting in 700 casualties. The latest UNAMA report on civilian casualties in Afghanistan, covering from August 15, 2021, to May 30, 2023, reveals that Hazaras and Shias account for nearly half of all casualties during this period. One particularly brutal incident occurred on April 26, 2022, when five Hazara residents from Samangan’s Dara-i-Suf Bala district were shot dead en route to Balkh province.
Etilaat Roz reported five of seven targeted attacks from September 2023 to January this year, leading to 51 deaths and 71 injuries. Richard Bennet’s third report also covers seven targeted assaults on Shia Hazaras between September 2023 and January 2024. Meanwhile, UNAMA’s quarterly report, which covers around the same period, documented targeted attacks in Baghlan, Kabul, and Herat, resulting in 49 fatalities and 86 injuries. Etilaat Roz additionally reported four targeted attacks against Hazaras in Kabul, Herat, Bamyan, and Uruzgan provinces in March and April 2024, leaving 16 dead and seven injured.
From Crimes Against Humanity to the Crime of Genocide: The Legal Nature of Attacks Against Shia Hazaras
Richard Bennett’s reports underscore the systematic nature of attacks against Hazaras, pointing to clear hallmarks of crimes against humanity. Other rights organizations, including Human Rights Watch, have similarly highlighted the systematic and deliberate nature of violence against Hazaras, stating that these attacks fulfill the criteria for crimes against humanity. Some organizations, scholars, advocates, and legal experts have gone further and argued that these never-ceasing acts of violence against Shia Hazaras also bear many of the hallmarks of the crime of genocide. The U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum was one of the first institutions to voice concern following the Taliban’s takeover in 2021, raising the alarm that the Hazara community faced the risk of crimes against humanity and genocide. Genocide Watch and the American Bar Association have also characterized these attacks as genocidal in nature.
The remainder of this report will briefly review the definitions of Crimes Against Humanity and the Crime of Genocide from the point of view of international legal entities before assessing violence against Hazaras against those definitions.
Crimes Against Humanity and The Crime of Genocide: What is the Difference?
Two principal international legal documents define the crimes of genocide and crimes against humanity. The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, adopted on December 9, 1948, defines genocide in Article II as “any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group”: (a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; and (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. Nearly half a century later, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998) incorporated this same definition of genocide in its Article VI.
Moreover, Article VII of the Statute defines crimes against humanity as acts “committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack.” Such acts include (a) Murder; (b) Extermination; (c) Enslavement; (d) Deportation or forcible transfer of population; (e) Imprisonment or severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of fundamental international law; (f) Torture; (g) Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or comparable forms of sexual violence; (h) Persecution against any identifiable group on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, or gender grounds, in connection with any act within the jurisdiction of the Court; (i) Enforced disappearance of persons; (j) The crime of apartheid; and (k) Other inhumane acts intentionally causing great suffering or serious injury to body or mental or physical health.
In essence, the critical distinction between genocide and crimes against humanity lies in what is being criminalized in each. In the crime of genocide, the “existence” and “being” of a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group is criminalized, and therefore, members of such groups are rendered as deserving to be eliminated because of their affiliation to one or more of these groups. When it comes to crimes against humanity, the fact that acts enshrined in Article VII of the Rome Statute are widely and systematically perpetrated against civilians becomes the distinctive factor. It is integral to note that from an international law perspective, these definitions for both categories of crimes are strictly narrow. The acts outlined in each of the respective Articles in the abovementioned documents constitute actus reus, or the criminal act element of these crimes. In addition to actus reus, mens rea, or criminal intent, is also essential in proving these crimes, especially the crime of genocide.
In academic and theoretical discussions, the concept of genocide is understood and defined much more broadly. Raphael Lemkin, the jurist who introduced the term “genocide,” defined it as the destruction of the foundational elements of life for a national, racial, ethnic, or religious group. Lemkin’s notion goes well beyond biological existence, encompassing social, political, cultural, and moral dimensions of the collective life of such groups. More recent theories of genocide have further expanded the category to include political groups within this framework.
This brief overview of the definition of the crime against humanity and the crime of genocide offers some context and conceptual clarity to understand the violence against Hazaras in Afghanistan. The next section tries to elaborate more.
From the Legal to the Theoretical: How Should Attacks Against Shia Hazaras Be Classified?
There is a general consensus that the ongoing violence against Hazaras bears undeniable hallmarks of crimes against humanity. Numerous UN bodies, human rights organizations, researchers, and advocates have thoroughly discussed, documented, and characterized these attacks – all arguing that these strings of violence tick all the boxes for crimes against humanity. These attacks are widespread and systematic, with their victims all civilians.
As noted earlier, several organizations as well as many researchers, scholars, and advocates, have argued that these attacks go well beyond crimes against humanity. Looking at the legal definition in both of the said documents, it is undeniable that many of the “criminal act” elements of the crime are undisputedly present in the targeted attacks on Hazaras, especially those falling under sub-article a, b, and c of the definition. For instance, one of the most recent massacres occurred when 14 Hazara civilians were executed in cold blood, later claimed by ISKP, in a remote district bordering Daikundi and Ghor provinces this past September. These victims were killed solely due to their ethnic and religious identity. This clearly fulfills acts under sub-article a of the definition. Similar patterns of genocidal violence exist in attacks on Hazara schools, educational centers, wedding halls, hospitals, and other civilian spaces.
There is ample evidence of criminal intent as well. Several critical elements point to the intent behind these attacks. First is the consistent pattern. Since 2010, Shia Hazaras have faced systematic attacks that have only intensified, especially with the rise of ISKP. The scale and scope of these attacks have expanded over time, affecting almost every aspect of Hazaras’ life. Public transportation, cultural and educational centers, wedding halls, maternity hospitals, sports facilities, religious sites, and gatherings have all been subject to relentless targeted attacks, creating a constant threat to Hazaras’ everyday existence. Second, the frequency and persistence of these attacks over more than a decade demonstrate a sustained assault on the hope and future of the Hazara community. Third, the language used by the perpetrators, particularly ISKP, carries significant weight. According to UNAMA, ISKP has claimed responsibility for many attacks on Shia Hazaras, advocating a “kill them wherever you find them” campaign and branding Hazaras as “infidels.”
A notable case is the massacre in Uruzgan Province’s Joy Naw area, where reports confirm that 17 Hazara residents were killed, underscoring an apparent intent to partially or fully eliminate the Hazara population in that region. The Taliban pressures have also led to the forced eviction of Hazara families from the Baghchar area as early as 2010, and in Joy Naw, of the approximately 500 Hazara families, only 200 are left.
These factors provide a clear indication of genocidal intent and fulfill the criminal intent, or mens rea, required for the crime of genocide.
Taliban’s Role in Genocidal Attacks Against Shia Hazaras
The Taliban deny any genocide against Hazaras, instead claiming to have “established security” since taking power in August 2021. However, this very denial speaks voluminously in this context, and genocide scholars such as Dr. Gregory Stanton classify it as one of the ten stages of genocide. However, the Taliban’s role goes far beyond mere denial. On the one hand, they bear direct responsibility for certain attacks and targeted killings of Hazaras, both historically and in the present. On the other, as de facto rulers, they hold a responsibility to protect the Hazara population and ensure civilian safety, and therefore, any failure implicates them directly. Additionally, the Taliban contributes to genocidal violence against Hazaras in two further ways: by inciting hatred against Shia Hazaras and by enabling terrorist groups that target them.
a) Spreading Hate Against Hazaras: Setting the Stage for Genocide
The proliferation of hate speech against Shia Hazaras is deeply concerning. According to UN Special Rapporteur Richard Bennett, hate speech targeting Hazaras, including calls for violence, is widespread on social media and sometimes voiced in Friday sermons across the country. In July 2022, Taliban morality police authorities at Bamyan University labeled Hazara faculty and students as “apostates,” suggesting they should be “guided to the right path.” Similarly, Abdullah Muntaqim, the Taliban governor of Malistan, referred to Hazara Shias as “heretics” in a public address on April 5, 2023. On May 25, 2023, Mawlawi Muzammil, the Taliban’s head of morality police in Jaghori, accused the local Shia Hazara community of being “ignorant of Islamic culture and teachings.”
In another case, pro-Taliban cleric Mawlawi Yahya Anabi, in July 2023, gave a mosque sermon in Panjshir where he singled out Dr. Sima Samar and Dr. Habiba Sarabi, prominent Hazara women, in derogatory terms against women, Hazaras, and Shias. His remarks were circulated widely on social media. Earlier in the year, and in a separate sermon, he called for the arrest, beating, and imprisonment of Hazara girls who wore “jeans.” The Taliban have taken no steps to curb this incitement or penalize those spreading hate speech against Hazaras.
b) Facilitating Terrorist Activity
Afghanistan under Taliban’s rule continues to be a safe and conducive terrain for a wide range of terrorist groups, many of them hostile to Shia, and one of them taking responsibility for the majority of attacks against Shia Hazaras. According to the latest UN Security Council report, ISKP, which views Shias as “heretics,” is among several terrorist groups, including al-Qaeda, which operates freely within Taliban-controlled Afghanistan. Al-Qaeda, with its long-standing anti-Shia rhetoric, has reportedly advised followers to relocate to Afghanistan, while ISKP works to expand its influence and recruitment. There is evidence that some terrorist groups, especially al-Qaeda, have gained footholds within the Taliban’s structure.
Further reports indicate that the Taliban have established settlements for al-Qaeda in Ghazni Province, close to Hazara-majority regions, and three more settlements for Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (Pakistani Taliban) fighters. Under such conditions, Hazaras live in constant fear and insecurity. With terrorist groups openly operating in Afghanistan and the Taliban showing no political will to counter these threats, Hazaras face an escalating existential threat. The Taliban’s tolerance of targeted attacks hate speech, and violence fosters an environment where genocide against Hazaras is increasingly enabled and legitimized.
What Can Be Done?
The security landscape under the Taliban remains profoundly concerning. The institutionalization of radicalization and the concurrent expansion of terrorist groups have worsened and normalized conditions that enable genocide against the Hazaras. Groups like ISKP operate with complete impunity, making targeted attacks against Shia Hazaras a constant threat. The limited public response to these atrocities signals a collective moral breakdown and a failure to organize and implement effective countermeasures. International bodies, tasked with addressing such atrocities, are rapidly losing both legitimacy and relevance in the face of shifting regional and global dynamics. This has led to a sense of desperation, hopelessness, and helplessness within the public consciousness. In such circumstances, answering the question of “What can be done?” becomes profoundly difficult and dispiriting.
Nevertheless, there are concrete steps we can take. Foremost, we must leverage all available channels and means to exert organized, systematic, and realistic pressure on the Taliban, demanding the protection of the Hazara community as part of broader justice-seeking efforts. Currently, this stands as the most viable and impactful course of action. Secondly, it is essential to establish a credible and robust framework for documenting, investigating, and reporting on rights abuses and violence against Hazaras as a bedrock for advocacy and justice. This initiative bears both moral and strategic weight in advancing long-term accountability, including but not limited to transitional and restorative justice. Lastly, we must collectively address the genocide of the Hazaras and the crimes against humanity perpetrated against them by pursuing international legal avenues, including active engagement with the International Criminal Court. This approach requires sustained advocacy, coordinated collective work, and extensive technical collaboration with these international institutions.
Note: This report is published with revisions by the author.
