After the Taliban regained power in Afghanistan in August 2021, China became the first country to upgrade its diplomatic relations with the Taliban to the ambassadorial level and made significant efforts to present itself internationally as a supporter of the Taliban. China has signed numerous economic agreements with the Taliban, particularly in the field of mineral extraction, and hundreds of Chinese nationals are present in Afghanistan as traders, investors, workers, and even advisers to the Taliban. China hoped that under the Taliban’s claims of providing security, it would be able to achieve its economic and geopolitical objectives.
According to analysts, China pursues three fundamental goals in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan, which also shape its main expectations from the Taliban:
- Access to underground resources, especially rare minerals;
- Elimination of the threat posed by the radical armed group “East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM)” which is designated as a terrorist organization by several countries;
- Reducing Western influence, particularly that of the United States.
To achieve these objectives, China was the first country to elevate its diplomatic relations with the Taliban to the ambassadorial level and included Taliban-controlled Afghanistan on the list of countries eligible for tariff exemptions on commercial goods. In addition, China has become one of the most significant international backers of the Taliban. But what has China received in return for this friendly—yet calculated—approach?
Over the past four years, at least four armed attacks have targeted Chinese citizens either inside Afghanistan or in border areas with Tajikistan, resulting in Chinese nationals being injured or killed.
In December 2022, the first attack targeted a hotel in Kabul that housed Chinese citizens. According to information from the Emergency Hospital in Kabul, the attack resulted in the deaths of three people and injuries to 18 others. Although the Taliban did not provide information about Chinese casualties, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirmed that five of its citizens had been wounded. ISIS-K claimed responsibility for the attack.
In the second incident, a Chinese national working in a gold mine in Takhar Province was killed on January 22, 2025. ISIS also claimed responsibility for this attack, and China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs demanded that the matter be addressed. To date, the Taliban have not clearly announced the results of their actions, although a few days after the incident, they claimed to have arrested suspects involved in the attack.
In the past week, two additional armed attacks—reportedly planned from inside Afghanistan but carried out on Tajik territory—resulted in the deaths of at least five Chinese nationals and injuries to two others. These incidents are unprecedented in nature and have heightened regional security concerns, particularly for Tajikistan. Earlier this year, amid similar threats, CSTO member states designated reinforcement of the Afghanistan–Tajikistan border as a priority.
1. The Attack on Gold Mine Workers in Shamsuddin Shohin District
This district—previously known as Shurabad—is one of the important and mountainous districts of the Kulob region in southern Tajikistan, and it shares a border with the Shahr-e Buzurg district of Badakhshan Province in Afghanistan. The attack occurred in one of the most remote parts of this district, in the high mountain area of Sarigor, targeting employees of a company involved in gold extraction called Shohin SM. This company has been extracting gold for several years, and Chinese nationals also work there as technical experts and skilled labourers.
According to information released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Tajikistan, the attack was carried out from Afghan territory using a drone capable of carrying a grenade. A review of publicly available satellite imagery shows that the mine site is roughly four kilometres from the nearest point on Afghan soil, and within that stretch there are at least three Tajik border security posts. One of these posts appears to have been constructed in 2023, suggesting that security concerns may have existed even earlier.
Red circle – location of the attack
Orange line – shortest distance between the attack site and the Afghanistan territory
Orange circle – likely drone launch point
Green circles – Tajik border security posts
Blue circle – Gold mine compounds
On the Afghan side, a public road connects border villages along the Amu River—Yalur, Shulir-Payin, Shalmund, and Yawiz—in Shahr-e Buzurg district of Badakhshan. Local residents use this route regularly. Since the Taliban’s return to power, at least three gold extraction sites have become active along this road, employing a considerable number of workers.
According to a knowledgeable source in Badakhshan Province, most workers in these mines are non-local, and their security is provided by armed units from the Taliban’s Public Protection Directorate under the Ministry of Interior. Each mine is reportedly guarded by at least ten Taliban soldiers or sentries.
Satellite imagery indicates that residential facilities for Shohin SM workers consist of organized buildings with construction materials and essential equipment. Given the extreme cold in this region, sturdy structures are necessary for housing. These conditions raise questions about the Tajik Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ claim that the attack involved only a basic drone carrying a grenade.
According to official information, the attack took place in the early hours of the night (around 2 a.m.), when workers would likely have been inside their accommodations. Given the cold weather and lack of lighting, it is improbable that anyone would have been outside. Under such circumstances, a grenade alone would be unlikely to destroy a building or kill occupants—unless a larger suicide drone carrying greater explosives was used, capable of penetrating a window or opening before detonation. This scenario also appears unlikely given that windows are usually kept closed during cold nights.
Due to limited access to open-source information in Tajikistan and the country’s political and security environment, precise analysis is difficult. However, based on available data, several possibilities may explain the deaths of the three Chinese nationals:
First possibility: The attack may have been conducted using a larger suicide drone rather than one carrying a single grenade. If so, the launch point may have been the Yalur mountain range in Shahr-e Buzurg district, accessible via the same public road.
Second possibility: Armed individuals may have crossed into Tajik territory and carried out a direct attack, resulting in the deaths of the Chinese workers. However, the new Tajik border security post established in 2023 along the valley entrance would make such cross-border movement and withdrawal more difficult.
In either scenario, it is unlikely that the Taliban were unaware of the operation, as the group maintains a presence in the three nearby gold mines and in the centre of Shahr-e Buzurg district. This suggests that the attack may have been conducted with Taliban coordination—or potentially by Taliban members themselves.
2. The Attack in Maymi District
Two days after the first attack, on November 30, 2025, reports emerged of the killing of two Chinese nationals in Razavi village, Maymi District of Badakhshan Province, Afghanistan. The area borders Darwaz District in the mountainous autonomous region of Badakhshan, Tajikistan. Maymi is one of Afghanistan’s most remote and least accessible districts due to its rugged terrain. For the Taliban, however, Maymi, like other districts near the Amu River, is strategically important because of its gold resources. Taliban members, smugglers linked to them, and even Chinese nationals are reportedly present across the mountains and slopes of this and neighbouring districts.
Geographically, the border in this area is defined by the Amu River. In some locations, including the site of the incident, the river narrows to about 60 meters, making it possible to target individuals on the opposite bank using light weapons such as Kalashnikov rifles and PK machine guns. As a result, the attack was reported as having been carried out from Afghan territory into Tajikistan.
Red circle – location of Chinese nationals / site of the attack
Orange circle – location of the attacker
Green circle – Razavi village, Maymi District
Green Victor line – towards Khorog, the capital of Badakhshan, Tajikistan
Yellow Victor line – towards Kulob, Khatlon, and Dushanbe, the capital of Tajikistan
The Chinese workers killed in the attack were reportedly employees of the China Road and Bridge Corporation (CRBC), working on reconstruction of the Dushanbe–Kulob–Darwaz–Vanj–Khorog–Murghab–Kulma road, a route that directly links Tajikistan to China. This project is one of the largest and most significant China–Tajikistan joint ventures, supported by the World Bank. Once completed, it will enhance infrastructure, improve trade connectivity, and reduce Tajikistan’s dependence on transit routes through Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan to reach Chinese markets.
How the Incident Occurred?
According to available information, the Chinese workers were targeted in the Shadog area, belonging to Vishkhrū village in Darwaz District, southern Badakhshan, Tajikistan—directly across from Razavi village in Maymi District, Afghanistan. The workers were constructing a small gallery/tunnel to manage the river’s flood path.
Satellite imagery indicates that construction of the small tunnel was ongoing between Lower Shodagi and Upper Shodagi, while the remaining road toward Togmai village had been paved. The roadwork from Khorog toward the site also appeared nearly complete. Several workforce camps related to the construction project were visible along the route.
Based on open-source information, two armed individuals positioned south of the Amu River—on the Afghan side—opened fire on the workers under the cover of night, as evening and nighttime construction is carried out to maintain traffic flow. The attackers reportedly used automatic rifles, killing two workers and injuring three others.
No group has claimed responsibility for the attack. However, in a similar incident in Takhar Province, ISIS-Khorasan had previously claimed responsibility.
Official and Media Reactions
In the hours after the two incidents, Tajikistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement describing the attacks as the work of “criminal groups.” The statement was cautious and general, avoiding attribution of responsibility or specific demands on the Taliban—even though the attacks reportedly originated from Afghan territory under Taliban control, which claims to provide comprehensive security and pose no threat to neighbouring states.
The Chinese embassy in Tajikistan expressed Beijing’s official stance, calling on Tajik authorities to investigate the incidents. After the second attack, the embassy advised Chinese nationals to immediately leave areas near the Afghanistan–Tajikistan border—a move that could disrupt several major China–Tajikistan joint economic projects.
Pakistan also condemned the attacks, noting that terrorism emanating from Afghanistan poses a serious threat to regional security.
The Taliban’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs responded by claiming the attacks were carried out by actors seeking to create chaos, instability, and distrust between the two countries. They asserted readiness to cooperate with Tajikistan on the investigation. Days later, the Taliban’s Deputy Foreign Minister repeated this position during a meeting with the Chinese ambassador, stating that “enemies” were attempting to sow distrust.
Afghan media covered the two attacks extensively, whereas Tajik media limited their reporting to official statements from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Security Council under Imomali Rahmon, without providing detailed analysis. Chinese media were largely silent:
The Global Times published a few short news reports, primarily reflecting the embassy’s stance in Tajikistan. People’s Daily, the primary media outlet of the Chinese Communist Party, published no coverage. Xinhua News Agency and China Daily also did not report on the incidents. CGTN, the international arm of CCTV, published only a brief headline citing Tajik officials.
It appears that media in both countries, likely due to state censorship, avoided publishing information beyond what their governments wanted, likely to manage public perception regarding the Taliban.
What Has China Gained from Engagement with the Taliban?
A careful assessment of the situation suggests that the Taliban have benefited more from their relationship with China than China has. Despite China’s significant increase in presence following the withdrawal of U.S.-led forces, at a time when many Afghans were leaving the country, there are clear signs that the Taliban have not met China’s key expectations.
The Taliban have sought to facilitate Chinese investment despite Afghanistan’s legal vacuum and have even shown flexibility on some of their stated commitments, such as the implementation of Sharia law, when dealing with Chinese citizens. Images have circulated showing Taliban members interacting comfortably with Chinese women and providing them various facilities, while enforcing far more restrictive rules on Afghan women.
However, the Taliban have recently fallen short on all three of China’s fundamental and unstated expectations:
- The recent cancellation of one of the largest oil extraction contracts signed with a Chinese company;
- The Taliban’s growing engagement with Western countries, particularly meetings with U.S. officials hosted with formal ceremony in Kabul;
- Most significantly, recent attacks show that the Taliban cannot—or are unwilling to—guarantee the security of Chinese nationals. This year alone, three armed attacks inside Afghanistan or from Afghan territory into Tajikistan have killed at least six Chinese citizens and injured five others.
This trend has seriousimplications for China’s economic projects and its relations withCentral Asian countries, particularly Tajikistan.
When examining potential scenarios, the only certainty is that these attacks on Chinese interests occurred in or from Afghan territory. China’s new national security doctrine stresses that security and development are inseparable. Consistent with this, Beijing has promoted its “Global Security Initiative” (GSI) as a global policy framework.
From this perspective, threats to China’s economic development constitute national security threats. The recent attacks not only endangered Chinese citizens but also undermined China’s broader national interests. Under its new security doctrine, China may feel compelled to respond.
Possible Scenarios Behind the Attacks
As no conclusive evidence has yet identified the perpetrators, three scenarios may be considered.
Scenario One: Terrorist Groups
The attacks may have been carried out by radical jihadist groups. Two primary suspects are ISIS-K and the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM). Both groups have a record of targeting Chinese interests, and their public rhetoric identifies such interests as legitimate targets.
A third, though less likely, possibility is Ansarullah, or the “Tajik Taliban.” The group is active in north-eastern Afghanistan, and reports suggest the Taliban have used its members to consolidate control, including assigning them security roles.
Scenario Two: Taliban Members
Exporting or managing insecurity has been one of the Taliban’s recurring strategies in dealing with neighbouring countries. By doing so, they seek to open channels of engagement or extract concessions. Several examples of this approach have been observed both in the region and in certain Western states.
For instance, terrorist attacks carried out by Taliban-linked infiltrators in Germany, Belgium, and Austria pushed these countries to engage with the Taliban under the banner of “deporting dangerous or criminal refugees.”
Currently, the Taliban have also been trying to improve relations with Tajikistan. Over the past weeks, these efforts have included multiple diplomatic meetings and visits at official levels, though they appear not to have yielded meaningful results.
It is therefore plausible that the Taliban may seek to pressure Tajikistan, the only neighbouring state that has avoided meaningful engagement with them and is believed to support Taliban opposition groups, particularly the National Resistance Front, by creating controlled insecurity.
Scenario Three: Competition Among Smugglers of Natural Resources and Narcotics
Since returning to power, the Taliban have facilitated extensive extraction of natural resources, especially gold, in north-eastern Afghanistan, signing contracts with domestic and foreign companies, many reportedly linked to Taliban members or operating in coordination with them.
Because many of these mines lie near the Tajik border and the region hosts various armed groups, Tajik security forces have increased deployments and spending. These measures have restricted smuggling routes for narcotics and natural resources, raising smuggling costs.
Recently, Tajik security forces intercepted a large shipment of narcotics entering their territory from Afghanistan via drones—something Tajikistan has consistently expressed concern about. Official reports indicate that most narcotics seizures in recent years, particularly in 2023, occurred in Khatlon Province, which borders Afghanistan.
Therefore, smugglers involved in this trade may have created the recent insecurity to reopen more accessible and less costly smuggling routes.
Despite the differences among these scenarios, one point is consistent: it is unlikely that any significant security operation in these areas could occur without Taliban cooperation or awareness. The Taliban maintain armed personnel in nearly every valley, district centre, and mining site. As a result, activities of this scale are difficult to conduct without their knowledge or coordination.
Conclusion
The security incidents of the past four years challenge the Taliban’s claims of having established “nationwide security.” The continued presence of armed and extremist groups aligned with, or tolerated by, the Taliban poses a significant threat to regional and global security.
The recent attacks on Chinese citizens highlight that the Taliban may not be a reliable partner for any country. Despite China’s early optimism, the Taliban’s rule has increased risks to China’s regional economic interests. Taliban support for TTP and the Balochistan Liberation Army in Pakistan has destabilized Pakistan’s security environment, creating serious challenges for China’s flagship projects there, including CPEC.
The attacks on Chinese workers in Tajikistan now threaten China’s broader economic interests in Central Asia, an area increasingly important to China’s national and security priorities under its new doctrine.
These attacks should serve as a warning to China regarding its current policy toward the Taliban. If such trends continue, significant changes in the nature of China–Taliban cooperation may become unavoidable.
Regional and global actors should also recognize that fostering or exploiting insecurity has become a central Taliban strategy in dealing with the outside world. This approach amounts to a form of political pressure on neighbouring states and beyond. Such tactics not only endanger regional security but also provide space for extremist groups that may persist as long-term threats, even without the Taliban.
Before conditions further deteriorate, a solution is needed that protects the collective interests of regional countries and supports the establishment of a legitimate and lawful political system in Afghanistan.
