By Hadi Miraan
The conflict between Pakistan and the Taliban has become a significant security concern for the region. Since the confrontation began, China and Russia have expressed their worries and called for its resolution through negotiations. However, three rounds of talks have failed to deliver meaningful progress or bring the two sides closer to a stable outcome.
The Taliban is a mixture of tribal and religious radicalism that was formed with the support of Pakistan to ensure Pakistan’s strategic depth in Afghanistan. The USA, UK, and Saudi Arabia had earlier played major roles in empowering the Islamist jihadist networks from which the Taliban eventually arose, bringing them into Afghanistan’s political arena.
Pakistan provided sanctuary, training camps, and political support to the Taliban, and even facilitated their travel using Pakistani passports. When the Taliban entered Kabul, Pakistan’s intelligence service chief intervened immediately to manage internal power-sharing disputes.
Some senior Pakistani officials congratulated the Taliban on their victory, believing they had finally achieved what Islamabad had sought since the 1970s, when Pakistan became a training ground for Afghan Mujahideen. Yet even as Pakistan celebrated, some political analysts predicted the end of the Taliban–Pakistan honeymoon.
A deep ideological and ethnic connection between the Afghan Taliban and the TTP allowed Taliban fighters to reorganize their military networks and eventually topple the former NATO-backed government of Afghanistan. Pakistan underestimated this relationship, even though it could just as easily empower the TTP to threaten Pakistan more than ever before.
Few in Islamabad expected the Taliban to distance themselves so sharply and support the TTP — providing them safe sanctuary and even supplying them with American weapons left behind in Afghanistan. The Durand Line dispute has added another layer of tension. Pakistan expected the Taliban to adopt a conciliatory approach, but this has not happened over the past four years. Although small border clashes have occurred between Taliban and Pakistani forces, both sides initially managed to prevent these incidents from escalating into larger disputes.
Despite this, clear signs of serious friction have emerged between the Taliban and Pakistan. Some experts argued that the tensions were superficial and unlikely to escalate, pointing out that many Taliban leaders have families, businesses, and personal wealth in Pakistan, and would not risk a full-scale confrontation with Islamabad. Others countered that the TTP remains the cornerstone of the Taliban–Pakistan relationship. As long as the Taliban cannot distance themselves from the TTP or expel them from Afghanistan, the TTP will continue to shape the fate of both the Taliban and Pakistan.
The Taliban now face a dilemma with two equally dangerous paths. Breaking with the TTP risks internal dissent among Taliban ranks, where many fighters see the TTP as ideological kin. But maintaining the alliance brings relentless pressure from Pakistan and raises the likelihood of open conflict. The Taliban did not expect to find themselves in such a complicated situation where navigating decisions has become extremely difficult.
According to some experts, an immediate solution to the conflict between the Taliban and Pakistan is unlikely. Pakistan is now facing the consequences of what it cultivated over the past five decades. Its national security strategy has long relied on developing and supporting Islamic radicalism as a tool to destabilize neighboring countries and generate political or financial leverage. Now that weapon has turned against its maker, leaving Pakistan with an extremely high price to pay.
For this reason, Pakistan cannot control or sideline the TTP without first dismantling or toppling the Taliban regime in Kabul. Pakistan needs a government in Afghanistan that respects international law and does not allow TTP members or loyalists to use Afghan territory as a training ground against Pakistan. As peace negotiations between Pakistan and the Taliban continue to stall, a further escalation of conflict seems increasingly likely in the coming months.
Pakistan may consider using force to weaken or remove the Taliban leadership. Since the Taliban are not internationally recognized, Pakistan might not face significant external pressure if it moved to dismantle the regime. However, Pakistan cannot easily eliminate the Islamic radical ideology it has nurtured, particularly in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (formerly NWFP), since the era of the Soviet presence in Afghanistan. Consequently, Islamabad’s past and present actions toward Afghanistan remain shrouded in ambiguity, making it difficult to determine whether this is the end of Pakistan’s long-held dream or the beginning of a new one. For Pakistan, dismantling TTP influence is impossible without confronting the very forces it empowered in Afghanistan. Yet replacing the Taliban with a more cooperative authority is equally uncertain. Islamabad now faces the collapse of a strategy cultivated over half a century. Whether this marks the end of its strategic-depth ambitions or the start of a more volatile chapter remains unclear, but the trajectory points toward prolonged instability.
