By Sayed Hussain Eshraq and Zalmai Nishat
Afghanistan’s predicament, or problematic, must be re-evaluated through the lens of institutional crises, power struggles, and the successive collapse of political projects. Deep within this crisis lies an enduring rupture between state and society—one in which the state, rather than emanating from social plurality and mechanisms of participation and consensus, or compromise, has repeatedly been weaponised to impose a specific form of political order upon society. From this vantage point, the fundamental question facing Afghanistan is not merely who governs, but how the state relates to society and its internal pluralities.
This question is at once historical and philosophical. The history of Afghanistan demonstrates that whenever the state has sought top-down societal homogenisation, the erasure of difference, and the enforcement of a singular political identity, the chasm between state and society has widened, laying the groundwork for crisis, resistance, and political collapse. Conversely, Afghanistan’s society has perpetually been constituted by multifaceted identity, cultural, linguistic, religious, and social layers—i.e. Afghanistan is a mosaic—a reality that severely constrains any attempt to impose top-down uniformity.
Consequently, escaping the current impasse cannot be reduced to replacing one regime with another; it demands a fundamental rethinking of the logic of governance and the reconstruction of state–society relations. In this context, a ‘paradigmatic shift’ implies not the drafting of a pre-packaged utopian blueprint, but a transition from a politics of exclusion and homogenisation to a politics of representation, participation, pluralism, and rectifiability. Such a transition must proceed as an evolving process originating from concrete, tractable problems, institutionalising gradual reform, critique, and error-correction within governance structures rather than attempting an abrupt, wholesale reconstruction of society.
Accordingly, this paper explores the issue through five steps: first, it examines the historical roots of the state–society rupture in Afghanistan and the formation of its state-building logic; second, drawing on the philosophy of the social sciences, it critiques political holism, utopianism, and their consequences; third, it analyses the paradox of modernisation, the social transformations of the past two decades, and the rise of Taliban totalitarianism; fourth, it presents the Combined Comprehensive Roadmap (CCR) and the Political/Civic Convergence Framework (PCF) as an endeavour to bridge vision and action; and fifth, it explores the emergence of Afghanistan’s pluralist movement and its horizon at the Cambridge Afghanistan Series, held annually by Mosaic Global Foundation.
Ultimately, the paper’s argument rests on the premise that Afghanistan’s future lies neither in a return to the past nor in the design of a political utopia, but in the gradual reconstruction of state–society relations grounded in pluralism, inclusive representation, and openness to critique—an order wherein unity is forged not through the denial of diversity, but through its recognition and institutionalisation.
1. The Dialectic of State and Society: A Historical Re-reading of State-Building in Afghanistan
At the intersection of late nineteenth-century geopolitical shifts—the height of imperial rivalries known as the ‘Great Game’ (Hopkirk, 1990: 123)—the concept of the state within the political geography of present-day Afghanistan took shape not as the product of endogenous social evolution, but within the matrix of imperial diplomatic negotiations and the balance of power between the British Empire and Tsarist Russia.
This structural origin triggered a fundamental rupture between state and society. The bureaucratic and military apparatus, rather than reflecting cultural plurality and facilitating consensus amongst diverse societal groups, became an instrument for an engineered homogenisation, the unilateral imposition of centre-periphery dominance, and the preservation of foreign power and elite political interests. At both macro and micro levels, this trajectory rendered Afghanistan part of a ‘shattered geopolitical belt and a vortex of deep-seated internal conflicts’ (Cohen, 2015: 48)—a condition wherein the alignment of foreign strategic interests with domestic totalitarian tendencies perpetuated socio-political anomalies. The consequence was not only the weakening of state–society bonds but also the ‘reproduction of binary dichotomies of good and evil along lines of social difference’ (Vafaeezadeh, 2025: 28), deeping existing fault lines and sharpening the boundaries between ‘self’ and ‘other’.
Between the 1910s and 1940s, this process assumed new dimensions with the rise of modernisers such as Mahmud Tarzi, who drew inspiration from the Young Turks of the late Ottoman Era. The ideology of the ‘Afghan state’ was reconfigured, shifting toward an imported ‘ethno-state’ model aligned with Eurocentric nation-state paradigms. This model rested on the flawed premise that a unified nation could be engineered through compulsory racial/ethnic, religious/sectarian, and linguistic homogenisation.
In contrast, much of this plateau’s history—spanning from the Balkans to Bengal prior to colonial domination and the rise of exclusionary nationalism—was defined by layered identities, co-existence, and social diversity. As Omar Sadr details in Negotiating Cultural Diversity in Afghanistan, civil society and traditional structures of co-existence resisted this onslaught of state-building elites; yet, deprived of ‘structural power’, they were unable to fundamentally alter the dominant political engineering. Consequently, rather than serving as a platform for ‘cultural diversity and intercultural dialogue’ (Sadr, 2022: 52), the Afghan state mutated into a tool for imposing an ideological model and reproducing intra-group dominance.
2. A Critique of Political Holism and Utopianism in the Philosophy of Social Science
To understand why modernising, revolutionary, and interventionist projects in Afghanistan have repeatedly succumbed to vicious cycles of violence and authoritarian resurgence, one must turn to the philosophy of social science—specifically the radical critique of holistic approaches and utopian social engineering.
In his work on the philosophy of social science, Sayed Hussain Eshraq analyses the nature of social change and the limitations of instrumental rationality tied to holism, warning that attempts to abruptly recreate society based on abstract utopian blueprints inevitably lead to tyranny. Aligning with Karl Popper’s foundational critique of utopian social engineering, Eshraq asserts the superiority of piecemeal social engineering attuned to social reality as the rational path toward societal improvement, observing that holistic methodologies naturally incline toward absolutism and monopoly. He argues: ‘Piecemeal social engineering allows us to learn from the analysis of errors; thus, rather than sweeping reforms and holistic, utopian approaches, priority must be given to concrete, practical, and contestable problems’ (Eshraq, 2018: 142–143).
This proposition holds crucial epistemological value for explaining Afghanistan’s governance crisis. Afghanistan’s political history is littered with holistic projects that relied on absolutist ideologies—be it Marxist-Leninism, religious fundamentalism, or radical exclusionary nationalism—to engineer society from the top down by force. Alienated from empirical complexities, structural plurality, and the traditional yet inherently pluralistic fabric of society, these approaches failed to resolve crises; instead, by suppressing lived realities, they precipitated systemic collapse.
Therefore, the ‘paradigmatic shift’ in Afghanistan’s governance currently pursued by pluralist, democratic, and civic forces must not fall into the trap of a new utopianism. It must instead be anchored in incremental, problem-focused social engineering grounded in empirical realities—addressing concrete issues (such as human rights, equitable political participation, balanced power distribution, and development) while embedding institutional openness to critique.
3. The Paradox of Modernity, Two Decades of International Engagement, and the Rise of Taliban Totalitarianism
During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, as Yahia Baiza demonstrates in Education in Afghanistan: Developments, Influences and Legacies Since 1901, modern education remained largely confined to urban elites and served as an instrument for the political and ideological objectives of successive regimes, leaving the vast rural populace disenfranchised. Understanding this dynamic requires examining Afghanistan’s historical context, particularly ‘the relationships between tribal and religious groups, state-tribe relations, and the hegemonic role of elites within power structures’—factors that profoundly influenced policy choices and educational development (Baiza, 2013: 13).
Nevertheless, two decades of international engagement (2001–2021) delivered a major shock to this demographic fabric. Millions of girls and boys entered schools and universities, nurturing a generation conscious of civic rights, pluralism, and democratic values. This represented one of the most significant social transformations in contemporary history of Afghanistan. However, compromised by structural corruption and an inability to connect modern institutions with indigenous realities, the political system failed to translate this human capital into a durable social contract.
Following the collapse of the Republic in August 2021, the Taliban recaptured power. Grounded in an extreme, totalitarian reading of traditional jurisprudence, leveraging tribalism, and resurrecting the twentieth-century ‘authoritarian ethno-state’ model, they inaugurated one of the darkest chapters in political history of Afghanistan. This totalitarian apparatus—enforcing gender apartheid, excluding women from public life, marginalising linguistic and sectarian communities (ethnic apartheid), in other words the Taliban have instituted “dual apartheid,” in Afghanistan by and systematically suppressing diversity—stands in direct opposition to the pluralistic nature of Afghanistan’s society. In short, under Taliban rule, Afghanistan experiences a dual ‘gender and ethnic apartheid,’ where researcher and activists talk about the former, relegating the latter to insignificance.
Today, Afghanistan ranks as ‘the fourth most ethnically diverse country in Asia (after India, China, and Malaysia) and thirty-seventh globally, with sources identifying roughly 57 ethnic groups, 40 to 50 languages and dialects, and several distinct language families’ (Bık & Hooimeijer, 2025: 5). It is a highly pluralistic society in South-West Asia—a true ‘country of minorities’—where the enforcement of ideological uniformity is synonymous with the destruction of social life.
4. From Vision to Action: The Comprehensive Composite Roadmap and the Political–Civic Convergence Framework
In response to totalitarianism, political entities, civil society, women’s movements, and resistance groups have moved beyond politics of exclusion to forge a strategic alignment through collective deliberation. The Mosaic Global Foundation, in collaboration with the Assembly for Co-existence and Liberation (MEHR), established a working group comprising political actors, civil society members, resistance movements, journalists, and experts to synthesise 21 roadmaps and proposals into a unified document. This effort produced the Comprehensive Composite Roadmap (CCR), unveiled during Cambridge Afghanistan Series 4th in September 2025 and published in January 2026.
Synthesising political, civic, and resistance proposals into a coherent framework, the document avoids utopian holism and focuses on concrete, practical solutions. The CCR is not a blueprint for the abrupt overhaul of society, but a framework designed to enable measurable, rectifiable change rooted in social realities.
At the heart of this roadmap lies the Political–Civic Convergence Framework (PCF), designed to serve as an engine for change. Operationalising this framework represents a key step in translating a shared vision into an actionable strategy. It connects civic resistance, regional and global diplomacy, and domestic rights-based demands into a unified political transition strategy. Crucially, convergence is defined not as the erasure of political or ideological differences, but as the identification of a common baseline for collective action and an inclusive political process.
Central to this paradigm is the redefining of the state itself. Governance in a future Afghanistan must be legitimate, equitable, and development-oriented. The state must cease to function as an instrument of dominance for any single elite, ethnic group, or ideology. Moving beyond mechanical power-sharing arrangements, it must emerge as an accountable institution based on inclusive representation, committed to the full equality of all citizens—including gender, ethnic, and religious equality. Here, the state facilitates peaceful co-existence rather than engineering social diversity. Thus, a ‘paradigmatic shift’ in Afghanistan’s governance rests on four pillars: the rule of law, inclusive representation, fundamental human rights (including gender equality), and the recognition of social diversity and pluralism.
Furthermore, the Comprehensive Composite Roadmap is a dynamic, evolving document. Designed as a ‘living text,’ it integrates ongoing proposals, critiques, and supplementary initiatives from across Afghanistan’s society, reflecting the principles of contestability and rectifiability outlined in this paper’s theoretical framework. To deepen this consultative process, the CCR Secretariat is actively engaging scholars, human rights advocates, women leaders, entrepreneurs, former policymakers, medical professionals, engineers, and civic actors (Specialist), alongside dozens of human rights organisations, ensuring the roadmap reflects the full spectrum of Afghanistan’s diverse society.
The significance of the CCR lies not merely in providing a political vision, but in building a bridge between a shared vision and collective action. The central imperative now is converting this conceptual alignment into organised capacity for action, coordination, and a structured transition.
5. Afghanistan’s Pluralist Movement and the Horizon Ahead at the Cambridge Afghanistan Series
Totalitarian systems depend on the suppression of diversity and the denial of social plurality. Yet, Afghanistan’s resilient society retains a strong capacity to resist this trend and regenerate social plurality. The answer to Taliban totalitarianism is not a return to the past, but a movement toward an order where ‘unity in diversity’ serves as the foundational principle of governance and state institution-building.
In this context, the 5th Cambridge Afghanistan Series (CAS-V-2026)—hosted by the Mosaic Global Foundation on 4–5 September 2026 at Jesus College, University of Cambridge—represents an intellectual and organisational milestone for this movement. Functioning as a strategic think tank, the conference provides an academic platform to evaluate the roadmap and translate political transition theories into operational strategies. It offers a launching pad for Afghanistan’s pluralist movement to evolve from a ‘civic aspiration’—advocacy—into realistic policy focused on achieving durable peace, stability, and regional security.
This pluralist movement offers a vision where Afghanistan’s state serves neither domestic oligarchies nor foreign patrons, but acts as a custodian of the collective will of all its citizens—without gender, ethnic, linguistic or religious discrimination—while contributing to peace across South, Central, and West Asia.
The significance of Afghanistan’s pluralist movement extends beyond developing new political and intellectual concepts. Five years into the Taliban’s second rule, the regime faces severe structural crises, including crises of legitimacy, economic collapse, cultural rupture, and insecurity. Meanwhile, regional geopolitical shifts—notably mounting pressure from Pakistan on the Taliban—alongside armed resistance and civil advocacy, point to the beginning of the end for the Taliban project. In this historical juncture, a comprehensive strategy like the Combined Comprehensive Roadmap is vital. Turning this vision into a concrete reality will form the central focus of deliberations at the 5th Cambridge Afghanistan Series.
References
Baiza, Y. (2013). Education in Afghanistan: Developments, Influences and Legacies Since 1901. Routledge.
Bık, M., & Hooimeijer, P. (2025). Ethnicity in the political structure of Afghanistan 2001–2010. Karabük University.
Cohen, S. B. (2015). Geopolitics: The geography of international relations. Rowman & Littlefield.
Eshraq, S. H. (2018). On the Philosophy of Social Science. Azam Publications: Kabul.
Hopkirk, P. (1990). The Great Game: On Secret Service in High Asia. John Murray.
Sadr, O. (2022). Negotiating Cultural Diversity in Afghanistan. Routledge.
Vafaeezadeh, Q. (2025). ‘Expanding the Concept of the “Other” Across Boundaries of Ethnic Diversity and Collective Identity-Seeking’. Nebras, Issue 9 (Special Issue on Self and Other). Available at: https://nebras.eu/wp-content/uploads/2025/12
About the Authors:
Sayed Hussain Eshraq is a philosopher, writer, and former lecturer at Kabul University. He is the founder and editor-in-chief of NEBRAS, a peer-reviewed philosophical journal. He previously served as Afghanistan’s Deputy Minister of Education and has authored several books on philosophy, politics, and culture. Mr Eshraq is the founder and chairman of the Assembly for Co-existence and Liberation (MEHR), and in this capacity serves as the lead author and chair of the 20-member Combined Comprehensive Roadmap Working Group. X (formerly Twitter): @SayedHussainEsh
Zalmai Nishat is a writer, policy analyst, and scholar researching modern state-building across Islamic societies—from Turkey to Central Asia, Iran, Afghanistan, and South Asia. His research focuses on political reform, development, and regional security. He is the founder and executive chair of the Mosaic Global Foundation, a UK-registered charity focusing on Afghanistan and Central Asia. He previously led the Central and South Asia portfolio at the Tony Blair Institute for Global Change and served as a senior public policy advisor in Afghanistan’s former government. X (formerly Twitter): @ZalNishat
