Author: Besmillah Taban
International aid plays a vital role in supporting vulnerable communities during humanitarian crises. However, in countries where parts of the territory are controlled by terrorist groups, or in situations like Afghanistan, where the ruling regime is the result of a terrorist group seizing power, such aid is highly susceptible to diversion and abuse. In these fragile contexts, humanitarian assistance is not only a human necessity but also one of the most important and challenging areas of international policy-making. This is because the flow of aid occurs within a setting characterized by weak governance, the presence of illegitimate and oppressive regimes, limited oversight, and the severe needs of the population.
In war-torn or unstable areas, the lack of transparency, weak or even absent state institutions, and restricted access for aid agencies to those in need create conditions where armed actors transform from “merely security elements” into “powerful parallel institutions” within the governance structure. Such actors, by establishing parallel administrative and economic networks, manage and engineer the distribution of aid according to their own interests. As a result, aid that should reach highly needy populations inadvertently becomes a tool for strengthening the financial and military capacities of extremist groups, illegitimate regimes, consolidating their authority, and perpetuating cycles of violence.
In the current context of Afghanistan, where the Taliban—a highly radical group with a long history of terrorist activities—hold power, the situation appears even more alarming. There is substantial evidence that the Taliban use humanitarian aid as a tool to consolidate their rule and promote terrorism and extremism.
The primary aim of this article is to provide a detailed analysis of the mechanisms that enable such diversion and misuse of humanitarian aid. The central question of this paper is whether, as widely claimed, the Taliban and their affiliated networks have access to humanitarian aid and exploit it for their political and military objectives; and if so, to what extent the security implications of this phenomenon are serious, and whether the international community is unconsciously funding religious extremism and terrorism.
This article relies on the “Structure–Agency” approach and is based on field interviews conducted digitally with informed sources inside Afghanistan—including customs officials, border police members, local council representatives, village elders, Neighbourhood representatives ( Wakil-e-Guzar), and several media activists. It demonstrates how structural factors (lack of defined governance structures, absence of national and international legitimacy, political instability, shortage of oversight mechanisms, and legal and institutional gaps), in interaction with the purposeful actions of actors and networks affiliated with the Taliban, transform international aid from a tool of global support into an instrument for reproducing and reinforcing the power of this group.
Structural Vacuums and Conditions for Diversion
Although the Taliban have not made significant changes to the administrative and managerial structures inherited from the republican era, relying largely on these pre-existing frameworks, in practice these structures exist only nominally. Taliban actions are generally carried out without adherence to basic governance principles and standards, and are managed according to the interests of individuals or contradictory orders from the group’s leader and senior officials.
Administrative actions are implemented, worryingly, based on the power and influence of individuals within the Taliban structure. Any individual who can propose a plan and secure funding, regardless of the operational capacity of the institution under their control, can execute it. For example, Sirajuddin Haqqani, as the “acting Minister of Interior,” is involved in activities ranging from jihadist Madrasa and building graves for suicide attackers to road building. He constructs towns and orphanages for the families of his network’s suicide attackers and holds repeated meetings with ambassadors of countries aligned with the group concerning foreign policy. The Ministry of Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice (PVPV) carries out policing functions.
My findings indicate that within the Taliban structure, there is no codified or respected law, creating a vacuum that allows internal actors to operate freely and fosters widespread corruption. The absence of accountability mechanisms to the public—since the group considers itself accountable only to God, not the people—along with the lack of independent oversight, pervasive corruption at national and local levels, and limited access of donor countries to all regions of Afghanistan, even via intermediaries such as UNAMA and other international and national organizations, has led to aid effectively being diverted from official channels into parallel cycles controlled by Taliban individuals and networks, and even aligned groups such as the TTP. This structure allows Taliban actors not only to monitor aid flows but also to design, manage, and politicize them.
Mechanisms and Tools for Diverting Aid
Concerns about the Taliban’s access to humanitarian aid primarily revolve around cash assistance delivered by the United States via Qatar, flown to Kabul and occasionally to Kandahar. The way these funds are used and how beneficiaries access them has repeatedly been flagged as a concern by reputable media and research organizations, with some individuals and entities in the United States also criticizing the process. Among them, SIGAR (the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction) raised concerns in 2024 about Taliban and other terrorist groups in Afghanistan gaining access to international aid.
However, the Taliban’s access to and diversion of humanitarian aid has occurred at multiple layers and through various methods over the past four years, as outlined below.
Geographic Control and Direct Seizure
In Taliban-ruled Afghanistan, the mechanism of “geographic control and direct seizure” is precisely the point where the group has the greatest ability to manipulate, restrict, or appropriate humanitarian aid. Today, the Taliban are not a scattered terrorist group but a regime with full control over borders, customs, roads, airports, and all goods transport routes. This mechanism is therefore more pronounced and effective than ever.
Under the defined mandate of customs offices, all imports and exports of goods, including cash classified as humanitarian aid, must be documented, registered, and cleared. Since all land and air ports of Afghanistan are under Taliban control, this oversight ensures that every type of aid—from foodstuffs to equipment—is fully under their observation and control. No foreign aid can enter the country or be distributed without passing through these checkpoints.
The Taliban use this monopoly power to seize or appropriate aid for their own benefit. All vehicles carrying aid are inspected and recorded at customs, and along transport routes, Taliban security checkpoints control and monitor every truck. According to an informed source, even aid that is exempt from customs duties is partially taken at customs or along transport routes under the names of taxes, issuance and renewal fees, tolls, “Ushr” (tithe), or the Emirate’s share. SIGAR has confirmed in a report that international institutions have indeed paid such fees to the Taliban.
A village elder in a remote district of Parwan, involved in the distribution of aid in his area, told me that some aid is completely seized at the district centre before reaching the people, repackaged, and redistributed under the Taliban’s name or affiliated offices. He cited an example of international seed aid for farmers in 2024: although everyone knew it came from international organizations and foreign countries, it was distributed under the name of the Ministry of Agriculture.
Contrary to Taliban claims about security in Afghanistan, all international organizations providing humanitarian or other services are forced to hire guards for their protection. Recently, according to Afghanistan International TV, the Taliban have formally demanded that UN and World Bank offices use security personnel provided by the regime. These guards are exclusively controlled by the Taliban and are assigned under the Ministry of Interior’s General Protection Directorate, nominally as part of “security services” for international project offices and under other departments as “train protection.” Through this system, the Taliban charge international organizations for security services, effectively redirecting part of the aid budget toward these payments.
This department is managed by Saeedullah Hamas, a close associate and trusted person of Sirajuddin Haqqani, from Giyan district of Paktika province, a graduate of the Akora Khattak-Haqqania Madrasa, recently promoted to the rank of Major General. According to this mechanism, after requests from international organizations, which are effectively made under Taliban directives, security surveys determine the number of guards required. An insider familiar with the process said that the General Protection Operations Directorate exaggerates the number of guards needed, particularly to include many Taliban members from the Haqqani network, far exceeding actual security requirements even when threats were higher during the republican period.
Based on my discussions with multiple informed sources, public protection personnel, especially in the guarding sections, are mostly from southern provinces and members of the Haqqani network. For each of these individuals and the security services they ostensibly provide, such as office protection, bodyguards, convoy protection, and warehouse security, they receive payments from international organizations. The Taliban even designate some areas of Afghanistan as “vulnerable” or “unsafe,” and use this classification either to prevent independent operations by international agencies or to extract higher security fees.
This system, along with the substantial fees collected from international organizations providing humanitarian aid, creates incentives for recruiting Taliban members, particularly from the Haqqani network. Within this structure—considered outside the formal Ministry of Interior—the Haqqani network controls hundreds of soldiers, thousands of weapons, vehicles, and security equipment, which some experts believe provides an extraordinary opportunity to preserve and sustain the Haqqani network within the Taliban structure.
Additionally, credible reports indicate that the Taliban distribute humanitarian aid as salaries to their employees. This practice intentionally deprives poor people with no Taliban connections from receiving aid.
Organized Influence in Distribution Networks
In the current context of Taliban-ruled Afghanistan, organized influence over distribution networks has become one of the most complex and hidden mechanisms for diverting international aid. Unlike their public image as a force relying solely on coercion, the Taliban today also employ administrative (even if incomplete), social, and psychological tools to subtly control the flow of aid—a method that, unlike direct seizure, is less visible but far more effective.
Since the Taliban now hold general control, they do not require overt threats to enforce their demands. Their structural presence and informants in every village, market, district, and province, combined with ruthless and arbitrary punishments, are sufficient to exert psychological pressure. Local staff of international organizations are well aware that any failure to cooperate with members of this group—even if contrary to law or what the Taliban call Sharia—can have personal, familial, or social consequences.
In September 2022, OCHA noted Taliban interference in humanitarian aid operations and the imposition of restrictions on humanitarian agencies, stating: “Humanitarian partners have expressed concerns regarding operational directives from the de facto authorities (DFAs), aimed at regulating and effectively monitoring aid agency activities, thereby restricting the humanitarian space through efforts to influence beneficiary selection, program design, recruitment of staff, and creating bureaucratic obstacles in project implementation.”
According to OCHA reports, in 2022 alone, the Taliban issued at least 108 directives related to humanitarian operations, directly impacting the humanitarian environment:
- 84 directives concerning interference in humanitarian activity implementation,
- 17 directives regarding restrictions on movement of agencies, staff, or goods within the country,
- 4 directives concerning violence against staff, property, and humanitarian facilities,
- 1 directive restricting entry of agencies, staff, or goods into the country.
“Mohammad” (a pseudonym), a former employee of an international organization managing humanitarian aid in the central zone, particularly Bamyan province, told me that many local staff are compelled to internally report to the Taliban. The Taliban demand lists of beneficiaries, distribution areas, delivery routes, and quantities. He recounted an instance when a Taliban intelligence officer arrived at the district office with a complete list of recipients and instructed the organization’s district manager not to distribute aid to certain families, stating that the directive came from above.
Mohammad noted that the affected families were genuinely deserving. One family had no source of income; after the previous government fell, the family head, a former army member, had lost his position and had been disabled due to war.
My findings from conversations with several village elders in the provinces of Maidan Wardak, Parwan, and Ghor show that the Taliban, in some cases, force the employees of aid organizations to cooperate through summons, interrogations, or informal warnings. One of these village elders said:
“One day, the district intelligence officer called me in and said that a certain person who works for an organization is from your village. Tell him to come to the district office the day after tomorrow—which happened to be Friday. I asked, ‘On Friday?’ He replied, ‘Yes, it’s important.’ When I delivered this message to that person in our village, he had no choice but to go to the district office on Friday, and he returned late in the evening.
The next day when I saw him in the village, I asked what had happened. He said that someone had filed a complaint, claiming I owed him money from the Republic era. The intelligence officer forgave me, but asked me to cooperate with him and gave me his phone number.”
Another issue is the appointment of individuals close to the Taliban to important positions within aid organizations or NGOs at various levels. In this case, instead of direct interference, the Taliban try to influence the approach of humanitarian organizations through their preferred individuals. These people are often not formal members of the Taliban, but are affiliated with them—through tribal ties, loyalty, or other connections. Therefore, their presence does not trigger international sensitivity. In practice, however, they are the ones who decide who is included on the aid-recipient lists and who is removed. They prioritize distribution in areas recommended by the Taliban or where their supporters are concentrated. They also prepare reports in line with the Taliban’s preferences.
OCHA also reported in 2024 on the Taliban’s intervention and pressure to hire members of their group in projects related to humanitarian aid. There are numerous instances where, during periods of reduced aid, local staff of aid organizations manipulates dangerous situations in certain areas to secure the continuation of their own jobs and, at the same time, ensure that aid distribution remains prioritized for Taliban access. This approach allows the Taliban to maintain deep control over the flow of aid without any overt interference.
Document manipulation, list alteration, and flawed registration systems further enable group and personal exploitation of aid. In many parts of Afghanistan, digital and verifiable record-keeping is impossible, creating significant space for manipulation.
The Taliban and their affiliates often fail to properly register beneficiaries or modify records post-registration. For example, according to findings from the Bolaq analysts network in 2023, the Taliban pressured agencies to redirect cash assistance from residents of Nahur district, Ghazni province, to nomadic Kuchi populations. When an agency resisted, the Taliban blocked aid distribution to the local Hazara community, sending it back to Kabul.
Multiple credible reports indicate that the Taliban add the names of individuals affiliated with their group, or their family members, to the lists of eligible recipients in all rounds of humanitarian aid. According to a report by Zan Times, the Taliban in Ghor province even collected aid that had already been distributed to the people, stating, ‘We will build through this road.’ BBC Persian also confirmed this issue in a 2024 report, stating that the Taliban pressure certain organizations to include members of their group on the lists of aid recipients, even though these individuals are not actually eligible for the humanitarian assistance.
Based on my findings from conversations with various sources, Taliban intelligence personnel and local offices have even removed entire families from aid recipient lists simply because a family member posted a critical comment on Facebook. A village elder in Ghazni province told me: that an organization, which was supposed to provide food and improved seed distribution to the local population, asked him to help compile the list of eligible recipients. After we prepared the list, when it was taken to the district office, the names of four families who were genuinely in need had been removed. When I asked for an explanation, a district employee told me that members of these families had posted against the Emirate on social media. Interestingly, one of the Facebook posts in question dated back to 2019, when the Taliban were not in power.
In this context, humanitarian aid is diverted without the use of overt violence. This model of diversion is, in effect, “legalized” and difficult to detect. The Taliban’s organized influence over distribution networks demonstrates that their control over aid does not rely solely on force; instead, they leverage administrative, social, and psychological power to establish soft and hidden control over international resources. This mechanism makes diversion difficult to trace, redesigns the flow of aid to serve Taliban interests, and enables the group to use foreign resources to consolidate its power without firing a single bullet.
Use of Front Institutions
Armed and terrorist groups, as well as unaccountable regimes like the Taliban, exploit ostensibly charitable, non-governmental, social, or educational institutions to divert, seize, or manage foreign aid covertly. These organizations, formally registered as charities, social associations, orphanages, religious centres, or local organizations, function in practice as part of the financial and influence networks of the group.
According to a 2023 New York Sun report which cites an anti-Taliban opposition group, the Taliban have set up around 900 ‘fake NGOs’ to access humanitarian projects. In Afghanistan’s current structure, the Taliban continuously employ this mechanism for indirect access to foreign aid, particularly because their regime is unrecognized internationally (except by Russia), making direct funding impossible.
My research, based on interviews with at least four sources in Kabul, Khost, and Paktia provinces, confirms that religious schools and orphanages managed by the Haqqani network receive foreign assistance. The network runs several orphanages, overseen by Qari Saeed Khosti, a senior member. This mechanism is one of the most sophisticated tools for aid diversion, as it operates under a legal appearance, making detection by external organizations difficult.
The Taliban’s Ministry of Economy publishes lists of such institutions, claiming that many national and international organizations have been registered under their rule. A notable example is the Islamic Information and Services Network of Australia Inc, officially registered on December 6, 2021; roughly two and a half months after the Taliban took power, despite Australia having no official relations with the regime.
There are many such foreign organizations on the Taliban Ministry of Economy’s list. Each of these organizations may claim that they do not provide any assistance to the Taliban and that their presence in Afghanistan is solely to support the Afghanistan people. However, the reality is that, in addition to serving as a public relations and propaganda tool for the Taliban, paying various taxes and complying with the group’s strict regulations represents a significant indirect contribution to the Taliban regime, creating conditions that facilitate the diversion of humanitarian aid.
Engineering Eligibility Criteria and Politicizing Distribution
Under the Taliban regime, in the absence of transparent international and media oversight, engineering eligibility criteria and politicizing aid distribution is another complex and effective method of diverting humanitarian assistance. Unlike direct seizure or overt threats, this occurs within administrative frameworks and appears legitimate, making detection and proof difficult for international actors.
There are no reliable information centres, no comprehensive census, and no accurate addresses. In this situation, aid organizations are forced to rely on “local Taliban information.” The Taliban exploit the absence of precise data and oversight as a tool to institutionalize systematic diversion. Consequently, even when efforts are made, no independent mechanism can accurately determine who is genuinely in need or why certain individuals have been excluded.
In principle, general or individual criteria such as poverty level, livelihood status, and households without a head, disability, and social vulnerability should be considered to determine access for a particular area, individual, or family. However, the Taliban administratively redefine and rewrite these criteria.
They add conditions such as local recommendations through village elders and Neighbourhoods representative ( wakil-e-guzars), approval from officials, and evidence of cooperation with the group. They prioritize individuals or families deemed “trustworthy” within the Taliban regime and exclude those considered “non-compliant,” “undesirable,” or “neutral.” This effectively replaces genuine need with political loyalty. The Taliban exploit their full control over local councils, districts, wakil-e-guzars, mosque committees, and village elders to manipulate distribution lists according to their own interests.
In conversations with several village elders and wakil-guzars in Ghazni, Herat, and Kabul, they expressed the belief that in many areas, people understand that receiving aid signals their proximity to or obedience toward the Taliban. This leads needy individuals, hoping to benefit from humanitarian assistance in the future, to attend Taliban-organized events, participate in the group’s mandatory social activities, and remain silent in the face of its violent actions.
This approach, like other Taliban policies, systematically deprives the most vulnerable and deserving groups—such as women without heads of households, certain ethnic-religious minorities, and local opponents. At the same time, it strengthens the Taliban’s social influence and power by creating networks of economic dependency, ultimately ensuring the regime’s continuity. International aid thus becomes a source of political legitimacy for an extremely radical regime with a long history of terrorist activities.
Etilaat Roz Daily newspaper reported in 2022 that aid rarely reaches genuinely deserving individuals; access depends more on relationships with agency staff. In Herat province, speaking Pashto is reportedly considered a criterion of eligibility.
As long as Taliban-affiliated actors define and manage eligibility criteria, international aid remains vulnerable to politicization, structural diversion, and instrumentalization for consolidating Taliban power. Mitigating this risk requires external monitoring, independent assessment, and eliminating the Taliban’s role in identifying and verifying beneficiaries, ultimately creating a legitimate and law-based government in Afghanistan.
Selling Aid on the Black Market
The sale of humanitarian aid by Taliban members is another recurring allegation. Multiple reports indicate that citizens have repeatedly complained about food and medicine intended for the needy appearing in black markets, sometimes sharing photographic evidence online.
Hasht-e-Subh Daily newspaper reported in 2023 that the Taliban sell humanitarian aid in Bamyan province, with Hajji Khan Mohammad Ghazi allegedly playing a leading role. This is particularly egregious as Bamyan and other Hazara areas in central Afghanistan are consistently classified as among the most in need in international surveys.
By selling aid in black markets, the Taliban divert humanitarian assistance from its intended beneficiaries and turn it into a personal and group revenue source. Food, medicine, blankets, oil, wheat, and other essential items meant for needy families are sold locally, allowing the Taliban to gain substantial financial resources without international transparency or oversight.
Consequently, black-market sales not only strengthen the Taliban financially but also undermine the humanitarian purpose of aid and compromise the legitimacy of international organizations.
Propaganda Exploitation and Legitimacy Building
Over the past four years, it has become increasingly evident that the Taliban have used humanitarian aid not only as a financial resource but also as a tool for propaganda and legitimacy building. Facing an internal legitimacy crisis and lack of international recognition, portraying aid as “service to the people” has become a key instrument for reconstructing their public image. The Taliban meticulously transform aid distribution into a media event: holding official ceremonies, placing local officials at the forefront, and recording and broadcasting carefully staged scenes featuring flag and group symbols.
Numerous media reports, particularly from outlets under Taliban control or broadcasting from Afghanistan, clearly show that the Taliban have turned humanitarian aid distribution into an opportunity for self-promotion despite widespread issues such as injustice in allocation, front organizations, and even theft and black-market sales. For instance, the Bolaq analysts network published images from aid distribution in Yakawlang district, Bamyan province, showing that the Taliban district governor consistently occupies the front row during distributions.
These displays help the Taliban project an image of a capable and in-control regime, in stark contrast to the reality of economic crisis, widespread poverty, and structural inefficiency in state administration. By controlling the distribution process and managing the staging, the Taliban present aid as if sourced internally or provided by the so-called “Islamic Emirate.” This approach not only misleads the general public but also facilitates recruitment; part of society, especially in underprivileged areas, perceives the Taliban as the sole provider of their urgent needs.
Ultimately, even when some aid is neither stolen nor diverted, it still serves the Taliban’s propaganda machinery. By shaping narratives, the group portrays itself as “servants of the people” and generates social support through distortion of reality. Such propaganda exploitation reinforces the cycle of public dependency on the Taliban, spreads misinformation to the international community, and distorts global assessments of Afghanistan’s humanitarian situation. This represents one of the most sophisticated forms of aid misuse: transforming assistance into a tool for sustaining a terrorist group’s rule without the need for direct violence.
Conclusion:
The diversion of international aid by terrorist groups is not an accidental or isolated phenomenon; it is the result of a multilayered, systematic, and intentional mechanism. This mechanism—ranging from geographic control and direct confiscation to institutional infiltration and political or propaganda exploitation divert aid away from its humanitarian purpose and uses it to strengthen terrorism and consolidate the power of such groups. The consequences of this process are not limited to the weakening of vulnerable communities; it also reinforces cycles of violence, political instability, and war economies.
The findings of this article show that the Taliban regime, as a group with a radical ideological narrative and a long history of terrorist behaviour, now governing the territory of Afghanistan, has diverted part of the humanitarian assistance for its own benefit and for that of its supporting networks through a multilayered approach. As a result, the humanitarian situation in Afghanistan remains highly concerning. Meanwhile, some national and international NGOs have turned this crisis into a commercial opportunity, and the Taliban exploit it as a source of revenue and a tool for sustaining their regime. Continuing aid without reforming distribution mechanisms can indirectly strengthen the rule of a terrorist group and facilitate the expansion of regional and global security threats, while a complete cut-off of aid would expose vulnerable people to severe deprivation and violence.
This Taliban approach, in addition to its political and economic implications, carries serious security consequences for Afghanistan and the region. The Taliban use humanitarian aid to reinforce jihadist Madrasa, support the families of suicide bombers and encourage the continuation of this practice, and expand their social base for supporting Taliban policies.
To mitigate these harms, international organizations must focus on strengthening direct oversight, employing tracking and transparency technologies, cooperating with independent local actors, and designing distribution models that are resilient against Taliban influence. Only through such structural reforms can humanitarian assistance fulfil its true role in supporting vulnerable communities and prevent it from becoming a tool of legitimacy and power for terrorist groups.
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Besmillah Taban is a PhD candidate in Security Studies at JU. He served in various positions within the Afghanistan National Police from 2002 to 2021, including as the Head of the Crime Investigation Department (CID). He can be reached on the social media platform X at @BesmillahTaban. https://orcid.org/0009-0004-2438-1060
