By Bismellah Alizada
Since October 7, the Western province of Herat has been hit by at least seven earthquakes and multiple aftershocks. With three of them magnitude 6.3, the quakes have taken more than 2,000 lives, and have left around 100,000 people affected according to the World Food Programme which has appealed that it needs USD 18.8 million for emergency assistance. Other organizations have also appealed for funding. World Health Organisation (WHO), for instance, requested at least USD 7.9 million to provide life-saving health assistance to 114,000 people most affected by these tragic tremors.
Tens of thousands of survivors remain in dire need of basic needs for survival, including food and healthcare. Assistance, however, has been shockingly slow and limited, and nearly entirely from international humanitarian organizations such as the UN Development Programme which has set up at least 15 community kitchens to provide daily meals for around 5,000 people. This lacklustre flow of emergency assistance reveals other facets of the crisis that the people of Herat, and by extension the entire population of the country, find themselves in.
The steadily aggravating crisis of legitimacy lies at the heart of it. For the past 27 months, the regime in Kabul has unravelled the already poor institutional capacities of the erstwhile government in providing services in general, and emergency response in particular. This grave situation is compounded by the never-ending series of decisions, coming in the form of decrees from an unaccountable and unseen figurehead, that have turned Afghanistan into an outcast in the international community. The regime has also turned itself into a loathed entity known to most of the people of Afghanistan – who have only become more destitute, agonized and furious – a disaster in itself.
This grave situation is compounded by the never-ending series of decisions, coming in the form of decrees from an unaccountable and unseen figurehead, that have turned Afghanistan into an outcast in the international community.
The preferential treatment by the regime is also contributing to its further alienation from a cross-section of Afghanistan’s diverse social groups. When a magnitude 5.3 earthquake hit the south-eastern provinces of Khost and Paktia, the Taliban’s cabinet held an emergency meeting within hours, allocated one billion Afghanis for emergency response, and utilized helicopters to deliver assistance. The regime’s supreme leader issued a message within the first hours, expressing his sympathy with those affected and urging humanitarian organizations to provide immediate emergency assistance. In the case of Herat, however, the Taliban’s deputy prime minister, Mullah Baradar, made an official trip to Herat after three days, announcing that a special commission was tasked to handle the situation. Nothing concrete, however, has been reported yet. The Taliban have demonstrated preferential tendencies in other cases as well, including diverting international humanitarian aid from certain provinces to their own constituents.
These are grave and unconscionable cases of systematic discrimination against certain groups of people that bear hallmarks of heinous crimes under international law. At a much deeper level, however, such treatment reveals something intrinsic about the regime: it is ineffective and discriminatory by nature, and innately incapable of reforms in the interest of justice. It is based on the shaky and deplorable foundation that defines itself as a force to achieve a dual end: “moral rectitude” through the implementation of the Sharia law and an ethnically hierarchical socio-political order. And sadly enough, democratic legitimacy and service provision have no place therein.
This grim situation is further compounded by at least two other factors: the international community’s political and moral apathy, and the lack of a viable political alternative thus far. While the international community has been speaking of engagement with the Taliban to keep humanitarian assistance – a lifeline for over 90% of the people along with remittances – the sector currently struggles in the face of funding deficits. For instance, as of August 2022, the UN had received only USD 1.86 billion in funding out of a total of USD 4.4 billion plan for the year. The situation for 2023 is even bleaker as only 23% of the USD 4.6 billion funding was secured until August, a considerable 17% decrease compared to the same period in 2022. The UN Food Programme had to cut food assistance to 2 million people in need in the month of September with its funding for food and cash assistance expected to run out by the end of this month, while a bitterly cold winter is just around the corner.
This grim situation is further compounded by at least two other factors: the international community’s political and moral apathy, and the lack of a viable political alternative thus far.
Another aggravating factor is the lack of a viable political alternative. While the people in Afghanistan have lost all the means, mechanisms, and structures to pressurize the Taliban and hold them accountable, there sadly are no such mechanisms among the political elites in exile or the diaspora communities either. Even an earnest and meaningful dialogue toward a solid agenda is nowhere to be spotted. In the aftermath of the earthquakes in the western parts of the country, these elites did nothing other than issue soulless statements. While it is extremely disappointing for the people to see such a lack of sympathy from these elites, they may rightfully ask why expect anything from them at all.
The people remain in the grip of a winter that foretells catastrophe, a wildly growing poverty, pervasive unemployment, potential other natural disasters, and a regime that appears to be concerned about nearly none. The most relevant question remains: what can be done? While the situation is highly complex, and there are no quick fixes or simple solutions to the multitude of overlapping crises facing the country, addressing legitimacy crises seems to be the right place to begin. But how? That is an even harder and more baffling question that needs to be taken more seriously than it has thus far been.
Bismellah Alizada is a PhD candidate at the School of Orientation and African Studies, University of London.
Afghanistan’s Deficit of Trust
By Bismellah Alizada
Since October 7, the Western province of Herat has been hit by at least seven earthquakes and multiple aftershocks. With three of them magnitude 6.3, the quakes have taken more than 2,000 lives, and have left around 100,000 people affected according to the World Food Programme which has appealed that it needs USD 18.8 million for emergency assistance. Other organizations have also appealed for funding. World Health Organisation (WHO), for instance, requested at least USD 7.9 million to provide life-saving health assistance to 114,000 people most affected by these tragic tremors.
Tens of thousands of survivors remain in dire need of basic needs for survival, including food and healthcare. Assistance, however, has been shockingly slow and limited, and nearly entirely from international humanitarian organizations such as the UN Development Programme which has set up at least 15 community kitchens to provide daily meals for around 5,000 people. This lacklustre flow of emergency assistance reveals other facets of the crisis that the people of Herat, and by extension the entire population of the country, find themselves in.
The steadily aggravating crisis of legitimacy lies at the heart of it. For the past 27 months, the regime in Kabul has unravelled the already poor institutional capacities of the erstwhile government in providing services in general, and emergency response in particular. This grave situation is compounded by the never-ending series of decisions, coming in the form of decrees from an unaccountable and unseen figurehead, that have turned Afghanistan into an outcast in the international community. The regime has also turned itself into a loathed entity known to most of the people of Afghanistan – who have only become more destitute, agonized and furious – a disaster in itself.
The preferential treatment by the regime is also contributing to its further alienation from a cross-section of Afghanistan’s diverse social groups. When a magnitude 5.3 earthquake hit the south-eastern provinces of Khost and Paktia, the Taliban’s cabinet held an emergency meeting within hours, allocated one billion Afghanis for emergency response, and utilized helicopters to deliver assistance. The regime’s supreme leader issued a message within the first hours, expressing his sympathy with those affected and urging humanitarian organizations to provide immediate emergency assistance. In the case of Herat, however, the Taliban’s deputy prime minister, Mullah Baradar, made an official trip to Herat after three days, announcing that a special commission was tasked to handle the situation. Nothing concrete, however, has been reported yet. The Taliban have demonstrated preferential tendencies in other cases as well, including diverting international humanitarian aid from certain provinces to their own constituents.
These are grave and unconscionable cases of systematic discrimination against certain groups of people that bear hallmarks of heinous crimes under international law. At a much deeper level, however, such treatment reveals something intrinsic about the regime: it is ineffective and discriminatory by nature, and innately incapable of reforms in the interest of justice. It is based on the shaky and deplorable foundation that defines itself as a force to achieve a dual end: “moral rectitude” through the implementation of the Sharia law and an ethnically hierarchical socio-political order. And sadly enough, democratic legitimacy and service provision have no place therein.
This grim situation is further compounded by at least two other factors: the international community’s political and moral apathy, and the lack of a viable political alternative thus far. While the international community has been speaking of engagement with the Taliban to keep humanitarian assistance – a lifeline for over 90% of the people along with remittances – the sector currently struggles in the face of funding deficits. For instance, as of August 2022, the UN had received only USD 1.86 billion in funding out of a total of USD 4.4 billion plan for the year. The situation for 2023 is even bleaker as only 23% of the USD 4.6 billion funding was secured until August, a considerable 17% decrease compared to the same period in 2022. The UN Food Programme had to cut food assistance to 2 million people in need in the month of September with its funding for food and cash assistance expected to run out by the end of this month, while a bitterly cold winter is just around the corner.
Another aggravating factor is the lack of a viable political alternative. While the people in Afghanistan have lost all the means, mechanisms, and structures to pressurize the Taliban and hold them accountable, there sadly are no such mechanisms among the political elites in exile or the diaspora communities either. Even an earnest and meaningful dialogue toward a solid agenda is nowhere to be spotted. In the aftermath of the earthquakes in the western parts of the country, these elites did nothing other than issue soulless statements. While it is extremely disappointing for the people to see such a lack of sympathy from these elites, they may rightfully ask why expect anything from them at all.
The people remain in the grip of a winter that foretells catastrophe, a wildly growing poverty, pervasive unemployment, potential other natural disasters, and a regime that appears to be concerned about nearly none. The most relevant question remains: what can be done? While the situation is highly complex, and there are no quick fixes or simple solutions to the multitude of overlapping crises facing the country, addressing legitimacy crises seems to be the right place to begin. But how? That is an even harder and more baffling question that needs to be taken more seriously than it has thus far been.
Bismellah Alizada is a PhD candidate at the School of Orientation and African Studies, University of London.