By Mustafa Suroush
We have just passed the second anniversary of the return of the Taliban to power. On 15 August 2021, after 20 years of terror campaigns, the Taliban ousted the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. Since coming to power, the Taliban have committed extrajudicial executions, tortures, extortions, and installed a fully fledged gender apartheid. In addition, the Taliban have continued harboring terrorist groups in the country.
Most anti-Taliban political and civil actors fled and now live in exile in the region and as far away as Australia, Canada, Europe and the US. Some have justified their escape on security grounds, others have remained silent.
The anti-Taliban actors come from all walks of life: various ethnic groups, political parties, women leaders, civil society, youths, religious factions, human rights activists, former government officials and the business sector. They are in a watch and wait mode, and some are looking for foreign political and logistical support – foreign patrons – to storm back into Afghanistan.
It was the tragic event of 9/11 that conditioned the international military intervention. Now the regional powers, such as Iran, Pakistan, China, Russia and even the NATO countries, though pursuing various objectives, seem to be preposterously happy with the return of the Taliban as the cheaper partner to follow their interests. “Remember what I said about Afghanistan? I said Al-Qaeda would not be there. I said we’d get help from the Taliban. What’s happening now? What’s going on? Read your press. I was right.” Joe Biden said recently to justify his decision to leave Afghanistan.
Right now, foreign actors do not perceive the anti-Taliban political actors as a threat to their interests. It has thus created an ‘inauspicious strategic equilibrium’ where – for the time-being – none sees any palpable interests to overtly offer any support to this disparate group of people.
Assessing the regional and global strategic environment, the Taliban have left unpleasant choices for their antagonists: total submission or war. At first, the Taliban wanted the opponents to surrender, pledge allegiance, and live a ‘normal life’ like the rest of ordinary people.
Ideologically, the Taliban believe, others ought to obey what they dictate. Secondly, the Taliban are keen to fight and determine the outcome on the battlefield should the opponents not capitulate. The Taliban believe neither in negotiation nor in power sharing – given their records, they have only ever resorted to violence to execute their policies. Whoever expects the Taliban to be moderate has a false assumption. On the other hand, the anti-Taliban actors have no more than three scenarios: continue waiting for an unlikely chance of international intervention, conform to the Taliban’s terms and rules, or transform the ‘strategic equilibrium’ to initiate change.
Scenarios
Scenario 1: Watching and waiting to carry on with cooling heels, reading the situation and waiting until foreign patrons come to their aid or the tide of the situation turns itself. A group of anguished senior ex-government officials, civil society leaders and former members of parliament are asking the USA to support them in restoring a legitimate government in Afghanistan.
General Abdul Rashid Dustom, for instance, recently said, “We don’t need American tanks or planes; we just need their political support.”
“If I get that and can’t teach them [the Taliban] a lesson, then my name is not Dostum.” He boasted.
There is no more time left for further deliberation and unrealistic expectations from the western countries; some western policy makers are already whitewashing the Taliban for misperceived stakes. The more sloth and complacency on the opponents part, the better for the Taliban to forcefully bolster their power bases at the cost of the lives of the people.
Scenario 2: Surrendering and pledging allegiance to the Taliban and withdrawing from the cause. This is the most ideal scenario for the Taliban as they can effortlessly punish their opponents. For instance, a former local police commander in Charbulak district of Balkh province, Lal Mohammad Gharibzada, pledged allegiance as he returned to Afghanistan from Iran, but the Taliban’s intelligence establishment killed him in front of his son’s eyes. This is a lesson for the rest of the anti-Taliban elements if they speculate on returning to the country. Furthermore, if more contenders return, the international community, against all odds, might consider recognizing the current regime in Kabul. This is where state-sponsored terrorism and extremism will be mushrooming across the globe, and along with that, the people of Afghanistan will be burning. Therefore, this is a certain losing-option for all, especially the anti-Taliban actors.
Scenario 3: Transforming – disrupting and changing – the “sinister strategic equilibrium”. As a result, new opportunities and threats emerge. The Taliban have no popular support among the people – 86.6 percent of the Afghans have no sympathy with the Taliban – and they are internally weak. The foreign patrons will be realigning themselves with new dynamics. This is a pragmatic way to bend and make the Taliban say yes to forming an inclusive, legitimate and accountable government, and ceasing abuse of human rights and preventing the spread of terrorism to other states.
Thus, to break and reshape the equilibrium, the following ‘systematic strategic measures’ could be taken. The cost of action against all current volatilities, uncertainties, complexities and ambiguities is astronomically lesser than inaction.
Systematic Strategic Options
- Mobilization of all incoherent anti-Taliban political actors to create a united front because they are all in the same boat. Making particularly more use of allies from anti-Taliban Pashtun actors at political and grassroots levels. Differences must be put aside, and they must all get united around shared causes: respect for the fundamental human rights of the people of Afghanistan, inclusive, legitimate and accountable government where everyone has a voice, and to prevent the spread of terrorism to other countries. Otherwise, the Taliban will eradicate their contenders one by one through baiting and bleeding. Furthermore, building coherent contact groups in every major country to communicate with the international community, mobilize the diaspora and facilitate dialogue to find common grounds.
- Building a comprehensive, new narrative reflecting common ends and values of the people. It should be, at the same time, in harmony with regional and international security concerns and human rights standards.
- In the first phase of systemic strategic measures, building small, but effective and efficient power muscles to exert force and launch psychological and cyber pressures against the Taliban. Although the Taliban have provided enough defeat opportunities, e.g., suppressive policies, brutal conduct, internal power struggle, harboring terrorist groups, and narcotic trades, one of the more vital targets with greater strategic implications is, undermining the center of their gravity – their extreme ethno-religious ideology. Moreover, organize large-scale protests inside and outside of the country.
- In the second phase, the seizure of geographical footholds wherever possible in the country. At the same time, tiring and exhausting the Taliban across the country, in particular in their local strongholds, such as Kandahar, Helmand, Paktia and Paktika, are highly impactful.
- Once the Taliban regime is tactically challenged, then the anti-Taliban actors should initiate negotiations. Henceforth, the international community can partake to support a comprehensive peace settlement.
Confrontation with the Taliban is unavoidable sooner or later. The anti-Taliban actors should face the Taliban on their own terms rather than the Taliban’s. The first and second scenarios defeat the anti-Taliban actors. They also deprive the people of Afghanistan from their rights for freedom and justice, and threaten international peace and security. Besides, the two scenarios bring shame and humiliation to the anti-Taliban political actors. Most of these actors claim to be brave warriors. Now it’s the time to prove the claim and restore the lost trust in the hearts and minds of the people and those of the international community. Hence, a house divided against itself cannot stand. Differences must be turned into strengths, synergies need to be managed and resources pooled.
Unfortunately, there is no easy way to bring Afghanistan out of the current quagmire with an oppressive regime that has inflicted the largest humanitarian and human rights crises in the world.
Mustafa Suroush is a researcher on political stability in Afghanistan. He is on X @Suroush_Mustafa.
Opinions reflect the views of authors, not KabulNow.
