By Sachin Yadav
On 15th August 2021, Afghanistan underwent a big domestic political change marked by the return of the Taliban, two decades after their first regime ended in 2001. It also marked an end to the presidential reign of Ashraf Ghani whofled to UAE and Islamic Republic of Afghanistan became Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan under what is now widely referred to as Taliban 2.0. This political shift triggered a recalibration of regional and global engagement with Afghanistan. Among the countries who are closely watching and quickly adapting to this transition, China emerged as one the most significant actors. Despite not formally recognizing Taliban 2.0, China has continued to maintain pragmatic diplomatic, economic, and humanitarian engagement with the new administration in Afghanistan since 2021.
For China, Afghanistan, with which it shares a 75 km long border along the Wakhan corridor, holds strategic importance as instability in Afghanistan is directly linked to China’s internal security concerns. This includes terrorism threats from groups such as the East Turkestan Islamic Movement, which has been designated a terrorist organization by the UN, as well as other organizations Beijing considers hostile to its Xinjiang policies, including the East Turkestan Liberation Organization, the East Turkestan Information Centre, and the World Uyghur Youth Congress. Beyond security considerations, Afghanistan’s economic potential , comes from its vast untapped natural resources ranging from lithium and copper to rare earth minerals have further strengthened China’s interest.
Diplomatic Exchanges
Taking account of these strategic and economic considerations, China stepped forward and began its early engagement with Taliban-administered Afghanistan. China’s outreach with the Taliban-administered Afghanistan began even before the Taliban took over Kabul in August 2021, reflecting Beijing’s pragmatic and forward-looking diplomacy. On 28th July 2021, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi met a delegation led by the founding member of Taliban, Mullah Baradar in Tianjin where China emphasized its concerns regarding Uyghur militants. The significance of this visit grew substantially after the Taliban’s return to power later in August 2021. Around the same period, China appointed Yue Xiaoyong as its new envoy for Afghan affairs in 2021, underscoring its strategic engagement with Taliban even before they assumed power in Afghanistan.
Following the establishment of Taliban 2.0, China further institutionalized this engagement. On 24th March, 2022 as a follow up to the July 2021 meeting, Chinese Foreign minister Wang Yi again held talks with Afghanistan’s Acting Deputy Prime Minister, Mullah Barader where Afghanistan assured that it will never allow any individual or organization to use its territory against China. Wang Yi also stated that China is willing to conduct mutually beneficial cooperation with Afghanistan in an orderly manner, based on respect for Afghan sovereignty.
A major breakthrough in China-Afghanistan relations under Taliban 2.0 came on 13th October, 2023, when China became the first country to appoint an ambassador to Afghanistan, with Zhao Xing officially becoming the sixteenth Chinese ambassador to Afghanistan. This diplomatic step was quickly followed by another significant development on 14th October, 2023, when Taliban attended the third Belt and Road Forum after receiving a formal invitation from China, which is among the highest profile multilateral summits Taliban has attended after 2021. During the forum, Taliban expressed their intention to formally join China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) by becoming a part of China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).
After this, China’s diplomatic outreach with Taliban-administered Afghanistan continued to deepen. On 1 December 2023, China became the first country to accept the credentials of a Taliban-appointed ambassador, with Bilal Ahmad Karimi becoming Afghanistan’s thirteenth ambassador to China. To extend their engagement beyond talks and dialogue, China further expanded economic engagement by offering Afghanistan tariff free access to its vast construction, energy and consumer sectors in October, 2024. This growing cooperation was further reinforced when on 20th August, 2025 Afghanistan held the sixth China-Pakistan-Afghanistan Foreign Ministers’ Dialogue in its capital city, Kabul, paving the way for Afghanistan’s potential inclusion in CPEC. Together, these developments reflected China’s gradual shift from cautious engagement to structured strategic partnership with Taliban 2.0.
Humanitarian Outreach
Apart from diplomatic initiatives, China has also extended Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) to Taliban-administered Afghanistan. On 22nd June, 2022 when the Southeastern region of Afghanistan got struck by a 6.3 magnitude earthquake, leaving 1000 people dead and 1500 injured, China came forward and provided RMB 50 million (approximately $7 million) as emergency humanitarian aid to Afghanistan. Similarly, on 7th October, 2023, when a 6.6 magnitude earthquake struck western Afghanistan which killed 2,445 people and injured over 9,420 people in eleven villages of Zinda Jan district, China again came forward and provided $4.18 million of emergency humanitarian aid within a short period. Similar efforts were put by China when a 6.0 magnitude earthquake struck eastern Afghanistan on 31st August, 2025 where it provided tents, blankets and food in the affected areas. These humanitarian efforts further strengthened China’s image as an early responder and reliable partner during crises.
Economic Engagement
To tap the economic potential of Afghanistan, several Chinese companies signed new agreements in mining and natural resources. One of the significant examples was the signing of a 25 year contract with Taliban in 2023 for the Amu Darya oil field in Afghanistan, with an estimated capacity of 87 million barrels of crude oil. According to the contract, the Xinjiang Central Asia Petroleum and Gas Co. (CAPEIC) would invest $150 million annually and Taliban would hold a 20 percent stake in the project which can be further increased to 75 percent. The project is targeted to generate 3000 jobs, making it the largest Chinese investment in Afghanistan under Taliban 2.0. Although the deal was terminated by the Taliban in 2025 over the Chinese company’s failure to fulfill its commitment, it did not significantly affect broader bilateral relations, indicating that engagement extended beyond individual projects.
Another notable example was the revival of the $3 billion Mes Aynak Copper mine agreement originally signed in 2008. The agreement granted Chinese state-owned China Metallurgical Group Corporation (MCC) a 30 year mining concession but continuous combat between NATO troops and Taliban stalled its progress for years. With Taliban 2.0 seeking economic stabilization and China expanding its resource diplomacy, the project was revived. On 24th July, 2024 Taliban officials along with Chinese businessmen and diplomats carried out a ribbon-cutting ceremony as work began on the construction of a road to the mining site which is some 40 kilometers southeast of Kabul.
Conclusion
In conclusion, China’s engagement with Afghanistan under Taliban 2.0 highlights a pragmatic and evolving relationship shaped by security concerns, economic interests, and regional connectivity ambitions. From early diplomatic outreach and humanitarian assistance to investments in mining and infrastructure, China has steadily expanded its presence in Afghanistan since 2021. For Taliban 2.0, China offers economic opportunities and a pathway to greater international engagement, while for China, Afghanistan serves as both a strategic buffer and a potential link to broader regional initiatives. As a result, China is likely to remain one of the most influential external partners shaping Afghanistan’s post-2021 political and economic landscape
Sachin Yadav is a Ph.D. scholar in International Studies at Jamia Hamdard, New Delhi with a background in economics and education, his work bridges political economy and geopolitics.
